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This paper presents an empirical analysis of “outsourcing” using establishment level 
data for UK manufacturing industries.  We analyse an establishment’s decision to 
outsource and the subsequent effects of outsourcing on the establishment’s productivity.  
We compare outsourcing in domestic with foreign-owned establishments.  Our 
empirical results suggest that high wages are positively related to outsourcing, 
suggesting that the cost saving motive is important.  We also find that foreign-owned 
firms have higher levels of outsourcing than domestic establishments.  In the 
productivity analysis we find that an establishment’s outsourcing intensity is positively 
related to its labour productivity and total factor productivity growth and that this effect 
is more pronounced for foreign establishments.    
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“Outsourcing” can be loosely defined as the contracting out of activities that were 
previously performed within a firm, to subcontractors outside the firm.
1  It appears to become 
more and more widespread and attracts increasing attention in the popular business press as 
well as in the academic literature.  For example, the Financial Times asserts that: 
“Subcontracting as many non-core activities as possible is a central element of the new 
economy” (Financial Times, 31 July 2001, p. 10).  Also, a recent article on car manufacturers 
in The Economist points out that: “The whole industry is disintegrating (or becoming less 
vertical) as vehicle assemblers try to outsource more and more of what they once did for 
themselves” (The Economist, 23 February 2002, p. 99).  There is plenty of anecdotal evidence 
that this is not limited to the car industry but is also observed in other manufacturing sectors.   
Outsourcing or fragmentation has also affected the pattern of international trade.  For 
example, Hummels et al. (2001) find that outsourcing (or vertical specialisation in their 
parlance) accounts for 22 percent of US exports in 1997, and for 30 percent of the growth in 
the US export share of merchandise GDP between 1962 to 1997.  Görg (2000) reports that 
between 1988 and 1994, around 20 percent of US exports to the EU are for inward 
processing, that is, they are exported to the EU for processing and subsequent export outside 
the EU. 
Various aspects of the trend to outsource have been discussed in the academic 
literature.  A large literature starting with the seminal paper by Coase (1937) and including 
more recent papers by Grossman and Hart (1986), Bolton and Whinston (1993) and Grossman 
and Helpman (2002a,b) examines theoretically a firm’s decision of whether to produce in-
house or to outsource.  At the heart of this literature are issues concerned with transaction 
                                                           
1 This phenomenon, which we refer to as outsourcing may also be termed “make or buy decision” (Grossman 
and Helpman, 2002b), “vertical disintegration” (Holmes, 1999), “fragmentation” (Arndt and Kierzkowski, 
2001), “vertical specialisation” (Hummels et al., 2001) to mention but a few synonyms.  
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costs and, in particular, incomplete contracts leading to either vertical integration or 
specialisation.  Lyons (1995) provides an empirical application to evaluate the importance of 
transaction costs theory for firms’ outsourcing decisions.   
More recently, the trade related aspects of outsourcing have also attracted increasing 
attention in the literature.  Trade theoretic models such as Deardorff (2001), Jones and 
Kierzkowski (2001) and Kohler (2001) examine the effects of trade in “fragmented products” 
on countries’ patterns of specialisation and resulting implications for factor prices.  On the 
empirical side recent papers by Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999) and Hijzen et al. (2002) 
have analysed the effect of international outsourcing (or fragmentation) on relative wages and 
labour demand using industry level data for the US and UK respectively.  In line with 
traditional HOS trade theory these papers find that international outsourcing (moving low 
skill intensive production to low skill abundant countries) leads to increased demand and 
increases in the wage premium for high skilled workers in the US and UK.  Egger and Egger 
(2001) investigate the effect of outsourcing on the productivity of low skilled labour in the 
EU using industry level data.  They find that increases in outsourcing have a negative effect 
on low skilled labour productivity in the short run, but a positive effect in the long run.   
In this paper we are not concerned with the international trade dimension to 
outsourcing.  Rather, we investigate empirically an establishment’s decision to outsource and 
the subsequent effect of outsourcing on productivity of that establishment.  We do not 
distinguish between international and domestic outsourcing since we are interested in the 
establishments’ characteristics that determine outsourcing.  We therefore may consider it 
immaterial as to whether the activities are outsourced to firms abroad or in the domestic 
economy.  Also, as we are interested in the subsequent effect on productivity for the 
outsourcing establishment it should not matter whether outsourcing takes place internationally 
or domestically.  All we may assume is that the firm will minimise transaction costs when  
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outsourcing activities to a subcontractor that can be located in the domestic economy or 
abroad.   
This paper uses establishment level data for UK manufacturing industries for the 
empirical analysis.  It contributes to the literature in a number of ways.  Firstly, this is, to the 
best of our knowledge, the first study to analyse the establishment level determinants of 
outsourcing using data for the UK.
2  Secondly, the analysis of the effect of outsourcing on 
productivity of the establishment is an innovation of the paper.
3  Thirdly, we investigate 
whether there are differences in the determinants of outsourcing, and productivity effects of 
outsourcing between domestic establishments and foreign-owned establishments which can 
be assumed to be part of a larger multinational company.
4   
We focus our analysis on establishments in three broad UK manufacturing sectors, 
namely, chemicals, mechanical and instrument engineering, and electronics.
5  Foreign-owned 
firms are important players in all three industries, accounting for about 12, 15 and 19 percent 
of total employment in the sectors respectively (see Griffith and Simpson, 2003, Table 4).  
We examine these three sectors separately as one may expect at least some heterogeneity in 
the use of outsourcing and, perhaps more importantly, differences in the impact of 
outsourcing on productivity across these sectors.   
The data used in this paper are available from the Annual Respondents Database 
(ARD) which is described in more detail in the next section.  Section 3 then examines the 
                                                           
2 Greenhalgh et al. (1999) have recently documented that there is an increase in contracting out of services in the 
UK.  Our approach is closely related to the paper by Abraham and Taylor (1996) who analyse the determinants 
of outsourcing using plant level data for the US.  However, they do not distinguish between domestic and foreign 
owned establishments.  A related paper by Swenson (2000) examines the decision to import intermediates for 
firms located in US foreign trade zones paying particular attention to the effect of changes in international prices 
on imported inputs.   
3 There are a few papers that look at the effects of outsourcing on manufacturing (ten Raa and Wolff, 2001) or 
service sector (Fixler and Siegel, 1999) productivity using industry level data.  Also, in related papers, Görzig 
and Stephan (2002) and Görg and Hanley (2003) look at the relationship between outsourcing and profitability, 
using firm level data.   
4 Note that with the data available we are not able to identify UK multinationals.   
5 More precisely, using SIC 1980 classifications, chemicals is SIC 25, mechanical and instrument engineering 
(hereafter referred to as engineering) includes SIC32 and SIC 37, electronics includes SIC 33 (manufacture of 
office machinery and data processing equipment) and SIC 34 (electrical and electronic engineering).  
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determinants of outsourcing at the level of the establishment while Section 4 presents the 
results of our analysis of productivity effects of outsourcing.  Section 5 summarises our main 
findings and concludes.   
2 Data description and summary statistics 
For the empirical estimations, this paper draws on the Annual Respondents Database 
(ARD) provided by the Office for National Statistics.  The ARD consists of individual 
establishments' records that underlie the Annual Census of Production and the data used cover 
the period 1980 to 1992.  As Barnes and Martin (2002) provide a useful introduction to the 
data set, we only include a brief discussion of some of the features of the data that are relevant 
to the present work.  For each year the ARD consists of two files.  What is known as the 
‘selected file’, contains detailed information on a sample of establishments that are sent 
inquiry forms.  The second file comprises the ‘non-selected’ (non-sampled) establishments 
and only basic information such as employment, location, industry grouping and foreign 
ownership status is recorded.  Some 14,000-19,000 establishments are selected each year, 
based on a stratified sampling scheme.  The scheme tends to vary from year to year, but 
during the period under consideration, the sample included all establishments with more than 
100 employees plus a selection of smaller ones. 
In the ARD, an establishment is defined as the smallest unit that is deemed capable of 
providing information on the Census questionnaire.  Thus a ‘parent’ establishment reports for 
more than one plant (or ‘local unit’ in the parlance of ARD).  For selected multi-plant 
establishments, we only have aggregate values for the constituent plants.  Indicative 
information on the number of plants is available in the ‘non-selected’ file.  In the sample 
period considered in this paper (1980-92), about 95 percent of the establishment that are 
present in these industries are single-plant firms.  In the actual sample we used for the 
econometric estimation this figure is around 80 percent.  Hence, most of the data used is  
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actually plant level data. 
The focus of this paper is on outsourcing activities of an establishment.  While there 
has been some empirical research in that area there does not appear to be a standard definition 
of what constitutes outsourcing.  For example, papers in the empirical trade literature (e.g., 
Feenstra and Hanson 1996, 1999; Hijzen et al., 2002) define outsourcing essentially as trade 
in intermediate products.  This appears as a rather wide measure of “outsourcing”, especially 
when considering outsourcing at the level of the establishment.  Using a more narrow 
definition, Abraham and Taylor (1996) define as outsourcing various activities, namely, 
contracting out of machine maintenance services, engineering and drafting services, 
accounting services, computer services and janitorial services.  Our definition includes the 
first two categories but not the latter three.  We define as outsourcing the “cost of industrial 
services received” by an establishment.  This includes activities such as processing of inputs 
which are then sent back to the establishment for final assembly or sales, maintenance of 
production machinery, engineering or drafting services etc.  Note that “non-industrial 
services” such as accounting, consulting, cleaning or transportation services are not part of 
that definition.   
Outsourcing can be seen as a substitute for in-house production and may therefore, in 
the short run, lead to a reduction in the total wage bill.  In some sense the cost of outsourcing 
is therefore equal to the opportunity wage that may have occurred to in-house employees if 
the services had not been contracted out.  We therefore decided to calculate an indicator of an 
establishment’s propensity to outsource as an outsourcing intensity equal to the cost of 
industrial services received relative to the total wage bill of the establishment.  Some 
summary statistics for this measure for the three broad manufacturing industries are presented 
in Table 1.  Note that the average outsourcing intensity in the electronics sector is 
considerably lower than in chemicals and engineering, although the standard deviation is also  
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considerably higher.  We also find that the mean outsourcing intensity for foreign owned 
establishments appears to be higher than that for domestic owned establishments in the same 
sector.   
[Table 1 here] 
Figures 1a to c also plot the development of the outsourcing intensity by sector over 
time.  Figure 1c in particular indicates that the propensity to outsource in the electronics 
sector has increased sharply since 1989/1990, leaving it at about the same rate as in the other 
two sectors at the end of the period under consideration in this paper.  Hence, the lower means 
in Table 1 can be attributed to the very low levels in the early 1980s.  This recovery appears 
to have been mainly due to domestic establishments where we see a considerable growth in 
outsourcing since 1989.  However, we also find that the outsourcing intensity in foreign 
owned establishments has increased over the total period 1980 to 1992, although there has 
been a slight decrease since 1989.   
[Figures 1a to 1c here] 
3 Determinants of outsourcing 
This section investigates what determines firms’ use of outsourcing.  Abraham and 
Taylor (1996) postulate that there are three general considerations that may affect firms’ 
decisions in that regard, namely, wage costs savings, output cyclicality and economies of 
scale.   
Firms may try to cut costs by contracting out activities to firms that operate at lower 
costs, i.e., offer lower wages to their employees.  For outsourcing abroad, this may be the case 
if market wages are lower in the foreign country due to the abundance of labour.  Even if 
firms outsource in the domestic economy this argument may still hold if, for example, a 
unionised firm pays wages higher than what it would otherwise choose to pay.  Even if a firm 
is not unionised a firm may still pay high wages due to paying “efficiency wages” (e.g.,  
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Weiss, 1991) to its employees.  In this case, while it may be sensible to pay efficiency wages 
to the firm’s “core” workforce there may be other more peripheral activities for which the 
payment of above market rate efficiency wages may not be justified.  These activities could, 
therefore, be easily contracted out to low wage producers.
6,7   
If the firm’s output is subject to heavy seasonal or cyclical fluctuations it may also 
revert to outsourcing in order to smooth the work load for the core workforce.  Some firms 
may choose to even the workload by assigning peak period tasks to outside contractors, 
thereby increasing outsourcing.  Other firms may, however, decide to reduce outsourcing 
during slow periods by having work performed in-house that would have otherwise been 
assigned to outside contractors.  Hence, fluctuations in output may affect the use of 
outsourcing either positively or negatively, depending on the preferences of the firm in 
question.   
The third reason put forward by Abraham and Taylor (1996) for the use of outsourcing 
is that there may be economies of scale for specialised services.  Hence, it may not be optimal 
for small or medium sized enterprises to provide a full range of support services, but they may 
be better off sourcing these from specialised providers outside, which are able to reap scale 
economies.   
While we take into account these three reasons put forward by Abraham and Taylor 
(1996) we extend their argument by postulating that we would also expect the nationality of 
ownership of a firm to matter for its use of outside contractors.  Foreign establishments, 
which are by definition part of a multinational company can be expected to use higher levels 
of technology than purely domestic firms, due to their having access to firm specific assets 
                                                           
6 This argument of course implies that firms cannot pursue different wage strategies, paying high (efficiency) 
wages to core workers and lower wages to other workers.  This may be due to unionisation, or to internal equity 
considerations.   
7 Outsourcing may also be undertaken to save on costs other than wages or to provide access to better 
technology, more favourable regulations etc.  Unfortunately, we cannot from our data measure such other 
determinants and therefore cannot include them in the empirical analysis.    
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(e.g., Markusen, 1995).  The use of high technology may lead to the contracting out of 
activities, in particular low-tech activities.  Also, if the foreign establishment is part of a 
vertical multinational there will be specialisation of activities and, by definition, outsourcing 
of activities to vertically linked plants within the same multinational.  Such specialisation of 
activities may be less for purely domestic firms.
8  Furthermore, given that they are embedded 
in an international production network through their relationship with parent and other 
affiliates abroad they may be expected to have different strategies for dividing in-house and 
outsourced production, and may have better access to external providers of services than do 
purely domestic firms.  Hence, we would expect that foreign firms have higher propensities of 
outsourcing than domestic firms.
9   
In order to test for the importance of these determinants we estimate empirically 
variants of the following equation 






dv D D D
foreign size un w w outs
ε
β β β β β β
+ + + + +
+ + + + + + = − − − −
...
... 5 1 4 1 3 1 2 1 1 0  (1) 
where  outs is measured as the log of the cost of industrial services received by 
establishment i at time t.  The regressors w
s and w
us are the log of wage rates for skilled and 
unskilled workers respectively while un captures the degree of unionisation in the four digit 
industry j, calculated using data from the New Earnings Survey.  These variables are included 
to capture the “cost saving” motive for outsourcing.  Given our discussion above we would 
expect high wage firms to do more outsourcing than other firms.  Also, firms in highly 
unionised sectors may prefer outsourcing as union work rules may act to increase costs, even 
if wages are no different in unionised and non-unionised firms.
10  The size variable is the log 
of establishment size measured in terms of employment and is included to control for the 
                                                           
8 Although it may be similar for domestic establishments which are part of a UK multinational.  Unfortunately, 
we are not able to observe UK multinationals in our dataset. 
9 The fact that multinationals have been found to import more of their intermediate inputs than domestic firms 
(e.g., Turok, 1993) may give some preliminary support for this assumption.    
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economies of scale effect.  Based on this reasoning we would expect smaller firms to be more 
intensive users of outsourcing.  However, given that our dependent variable is measured in 
absolute terms the size variable controls for the fact that large firms may do more outsourcing 
(in absolute terms) than smaller firms.  foreign is an ownership dummy equal to one if the 
establishment is foreign owned and zero otherwise.  As pointed out above, we would expect 
this variable to have a positive coefficient if foreign firms are more intensive users of 
outsourcing.  Furthermore, sectoral time dummies (dvjt) are also included to control for the 
effect of cyclical or seasonal variations in output in the four digit industries.  Finally, we 
include four digit sector (Dj), time (Dt) and region (Dr) dummies in equation (1). 
Equation (1) is estimated for each of the three broad sectors (chemicals, engineering 
and electronics) separately using ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation.  We allow for 
heteroskedasticity of the error term, as well as an unspecified correlation between error terms 
within establishments, but not across establishments.  This allows for the possibility that there 
may be unobserved establishment specific effects which are correlated with the regressors but 
which we do not explicitly account for in the empirical model.  The estimation results for the 
three sectors are presented in Table 2.   
[Table 2 here] 
In line with our prior expectations we find that high wages are positively correlated 
with outsourcing, which concurs with the hypothesis that high wage establishments are more 
prone to outsource in order to reduce costs.  The distinction between skilled and unskilled 
wages shows that the larger effects seem to stem from the former, rather than the latter part of 
labour costs.  For example, for the engineering sector (column 4) we find that the elasticity of 
outsourcing with respect to skilled wages is 0.38, while the elasticity for the unskilled wage 
rate is 0.15.  The rate of unionisation can only be included for the engineering sector where 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
10 On the other hand, as a referee pointed out to us, unions may attempt to prevent outsourcing in order to 
safeguard jobs, which would have a negative effect on outsourcing.    
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the coefficients turn out to be positive, albeit statistically insignificant.  Large firms also 
outsource more than small firms – in all cases, the elasticity is between 1.5 to 1.8.  This may 
reflect a pure size effect – large firms produce higher levels of output and therefore have more 
activities, in absolute terms, to outsource than smaller firms.  
We now turn to the importance of nationality of ownership for the use of outsourcing.  
As pointed out above we would expect foreign firms to be more intensive users of 
outsourcing.  As can be seen from columns (1), (3) and (5) this result is borne out by the data 
for all three manufacturing sectors.  Controlling for size, labour costs and cyclicality of 
production, foreign owned establishments use more outsourcing than domestic 
establishments.   
A reasonable question to ask then is whether the determinants of outsourcing are 
systematically different for the former compared to the latter as well.  In other words, do the 
slope coefficients on the regressors differ between foreign and domestic establishments?  To 
investigate this issue we interact all establishment level regressors (i.e., wage and size 
variables) with the ownership dummy and re-run the augmented specification of equation (1).  
The results are reported in columns (2), (4) and (6) of Table 2.   
We test for the joint significance of the three interaction terms using an F-test.  The 
test statistics suggest that for the chemicals and electronics sector we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the interaction terms are jointly equal to zero.  Hence, we do not find 
systematic differences in the determinants of outsourcing between foreign and domestic 
establishments in these sectors.  This is different in the engineering sector, where the 
interaction terms are jointly significant.  We still find that the ownership dummy is 
statistically significant and positive suggesting that foreign firms use more outsourcing.  What 
differs also between the foreign and domestic groups of establishments is the effect of the 
other regressors included in the equation.  The size effect is reduced substantially for foreign  
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establishments with the elasticities being 1.58 for domestic firms and 1.18 for foreign firms.  
Also, the elasticity of outsourcing with respect to skilled wages is larger for foreign (0.71) 
than domestic establishments (0.38).  
Two criticisms could be directed at equation (1).  First, if there are time-invariant 
establishment-specific effects that are not captured in the explanatory variables but that are 
correlated with them then our estimation may produce biased and inconsistent estimates.  In 
other words, if the error term included in equation (1) equals εit ii t vu = +  then a simple OLS 
regression is problematic.  In order to take this into account we relate the change in the 
outsourcing variable to changes in the wage and size variables, thus purging the 
establishment-specific effect vi in the levels specification.  However, we still include foreign 
and un in levels, as we are interested in establishing whether foreign firms or more unionised 
sectors experience higher growth of outsourcing than others.  Second, if there is persistence in 
the outsourcing decision then we may expect that the decision to outsource in period t is 
related to the level of outsourcing in the previous period t-1.  To allow for such temporal 
correlation between outsourcing in t and t-1 we include the lagged level of outsourcing also in 
the equation.  Hence, our alternative specification is described by the following equation 






dv D D D outs foreign
size un w w outs
ε β β
β β β β β
+ + + + + + +
+ ∆ + + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆
−
− − − −
1 6 5
1 4 1 3 1 2 1 1 0 ... ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
 (2) 
The results of estimations of this equation using data for the three manufacturing 
sectors separately are presented in Table 3.  Note that the lagged level of outsourcing is highly 
statistically significant and negative in all cases suggesting that there is indeed temporal 
correlation in outsourcing, i.e., present outsourcing is heavily influenced by previous 
outsourcing.  Inclusion of the lagged level leads to most of the explanatory variables being 
statistically insignificant.  However, most importantly from our point of view, the finding that  
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foreign establishments outsource more than domestic ones, ceteris paribus, is robust to the 
inclusion of the lagged level of outsourcing. 
[Table 3 here] 
4 Productivity effects of outsourcing 
Having analysed the determinants of outsourcing we now turn to investigate whether 
outsourcing leads to an improvement in establishments’ performance.  More specifically we 
analyse whether outsourcing has a positive effect on productivity, measured in terms of labour 
or total factor productivity (TFP), of the establishment that decides to outsource the activities.   
In a recent paper ten Raa and Wolff (2001) argue and provide evidence that TFP 
growth in manufacturing industries is positively related to an increased use of outsourcing, 
defined as inputs purchased from services industries.  Their empirical evidence is based on 
industry level data using US input-output tables to calculate the importance of outsourcing.  
The effects of outsourcing for services industries have also been investigated recently.  Fixler 
and Siegel (1999) argue that outsourcing has played a major role for the growth of the 
services sector.  Their empirical evidence, based on industry level data for the US, suggests 
that outsourcing has led to short run reductions in service sector productivity, but that there 
have been positive effects in the long run.  Extending this literature our paper is, to the best of 
our knowledge, the first study to investigate with establishment level data the effects of 
outsourcing on productivity in the establishment undertaking the outsourcing.   
As argued in the previous section one of the reasons for outsourcing may be to 
economise on labour costs.  An increase in outsourcing may therefore lead directly to a 
reduction of employment, while keeping output constant.  Outsourcing may, therefore, have 
an immediate effect on labour productivity.  Our investigation of this issue is based on the  
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following equation of labour productivity augmented by a measure of outsourcing intensity at 
the level of the establishment:
11 
it R t it it it it D D out l m l k l y ε α α α α + + + + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆ int / / / 3 2 1 0    (3) 
where y is output, l is labour, k is capital and m is material inputs, Dt and DR are time 
and regional dummies respectively, and ε is the error term function.  The outsourcing 
intensity outint is calculated as the value of industrial services received divided by total wage 
costs, as in Section 2.
12  In order to see whether there are different productivity effects of 
outsourcing for foreign and domestic firms we allow α3 to vary for the two nationality groups.  
Outsourcing may not only affect the productivity of labour but also that of other factors of 
production if it leads to an adjustment of the production process.  In order to capture these 
productivity effects we also examine whether outsourcing affects total factor productivity 
(TFP) growth.
13  Both labour and total factor productivity equations are estimated in levels as 
well as first-differences. 
A major econometric concern with the above equation is that there may be a potential 
endogeneity problem, i.e., there may be unobserved covariates that are correlated with 
productivity and outsourcing intensity that may be driving the results.  For example, it may be 
the case that highly productive establishments are more skill intensive and therefore more 
likely to use outsourcing in order to shift the production of low skill intensive components 
outside the firm.  In order to take account of this possibility we instrument for outsourcing 
intensity with the past level of outsourcing intensities, the growth rates and lagged values of 
establishment size, skilled and unskilled wages.  We use the robust form of Sargan’s test of 
overidentifying restrictions to examine the null hypothesis that the correlation between the 
instrumental variable candidates and the error terms in the productivity equation is zero; a 
                                                           
11 We assume that the intensity of outsourcing shifts the technology parameter of the underlying production. 
12 Note that we do not simply measure outsourcing as use of intermediate inputs (m) in the production function.  
13 See Appendix for a description of how TFP is calculated.    
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necessary condition for the validity of the instrumental variables regression approach.   
Depending on the particular sector and equation in question (TFP or labour productivity; 
levels or differences) instruments which are found to be invalid, are dropped from the 
specification.  
We are also careful to assess the strength of the relationship between the instruments 
and the potentially endogenous regressors.  It has been noted in the econometric literature 
(see, for example, Staiger and Stock, 1997) that when the partial correlation between the 
instruments and the endogenous variable is low, instrumental variables regression is biased in 
the direction of the OLS estimator.  Staiger and Stock (1997) recommend that the F-statistics 
(or equivalently the p-values) from the first-stage regression be routinely reported in applied 
work.  The F-statistic tests the hypothesis that the instruments should be excluded from the 
first-stage regressions (i.e. the relevance of the instruments).  The idea here is that when the F-
statistic is small (or the corresponding p-value is large), the instrumental variable estimates 
and the associated confidence interval are unreliable. 
Tables 4 and 5 present the empirical estimates from the labour productivity and TFP 
equations respectively.  As in the previous section we estimate the model separately for the 
three manufacturing sectors.  As might be expected the estimates display some heterogeneity 
across sectors. 
[Table 4 here] 
Turning to labour productivity first and focusing on the specification in levels, it can 
be seen from Table 5 that for the chemical and engineering sectors outsourcing is positively 
related with labour productivity.  It does not seem to exert any influence of the productivity 
path of plants in the electronics sector, however.  The elasticity of labour productivity with 
respect to outsourcing is about three times higher in the engineering than in the chemicals 
sector.  Furthermore, this productivity effect of outsourcing is more pronounced in the sample  
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of foreign-owned establishments as indicated by the positive coefficients on the interaction 
terms.  
The first-difference specification does not yield strong results.  Labour productivity 
and outsourcing growth rates appear to be correlated in foreign establishments within the 
engineering sectors.  This lack of robust correlation may be due to the weakness of the 
instrumental variable candidates, which are too weak as evidenced by the low F statistics from 
the first-stage regressions for the chemicals and electronics sectors.
14  In the absence of other 
instrumental variable candidates or a ‘natural experiment’ for the outsourcing variable, it does 
not seem appropriate to draw a firm conclusions about the effect of outsourcing on 
productivity based on the first-differenced specifications. 
Table 5 reports the results of the TFP estimations.  The level of TFP seems to respond 
to changes in the outsourcing intensity, again in the chemical and engineering sectors.  This is 
particularly pronounced for foreign establishments.  TFP adjusts faster to outsourcing in the 
engineering sector, particularly in foreign establishments.  From the first differenced 
estimation there is also evidence of a positive relationship between TFP growth and the 
changes in the degree of outsourcing for the engineering sector.  For the other two sectors, the 
low F-statistics from the first stage regressions may again indicate the weakness of the 
instruments used which may explain the lack of a significant correlation between outsourcing 
and TFP.   
[Table 5 here] 
The econometric estimates reported in the above tables give some idea as to the 
relationship between outsourcing and productivity, and the statistical significance of this 
association.  An interesting question to ask then is what is the economic significance of 
outsourcing in the establishment level productivity trajectory?  As a first attempt towards 
answering this question we calculate the implied change in productivity resulting from the  
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change in outsourcing intensity,
15 and relate it to the actual productivity growth observed in 
the data.  Table 6 reports the results from this experiment.  
[Table 6 here] 
Consistent with the reported point estimates, outsourcing played a more important role 
in the engineering sector: nearly a quarter of the observed change in total factor productivity 
and almost 15 percent of the change in labour productivity in domestic plants is attributed to 
the change in outsourcing intensity.  The effects on foreign firms’ productivity are much 
smaller with 0 and 7 percent, respectively.  Of course, to the extent that the outsourcing 
variable captures the effect of some omitted variable, the figures in Table 6 might overstate 
the importance of outsourcing.  Nonetheless these ‘back-of-envelope’ calculations are 
indicative that the role of outsourcing in enhancing productivity, at least in the engineering 
sector, is likely to be economically significant.   
5 Conclusions 
This paper presents an empirical analysis of “outsourcing” using establishment level 
data for UK manufacturing industries.  We analyse an establishment’s decision to outsource 
and the subsequent effects of outsourcing on the establishment’s productivity.  Our empirical 
results suggest that high wages are positively related to outsourcing, suggesting that the cost 
saving motive is important.  We also find that foreign-owned firms have higher levels of 
outsourcing than domestic establishments.  In the productivity analysis we find that an 
establishment’s outsourcing intensity in the chemical and engineering sectors is positively 
related to its productivity.  This relationship appears to be more pronounced in foreign- owned 
establishments. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
14 Notice that these instruments are valid according to the Sargan test, however.  
15 The point estimates from the equations in level are used to this end.  We confine our analysis to establishments 
with more than 5 years data.   
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Appendix: TFP estimation 




it it TFP m k l l f y ≡ , where y is 
output and there are four factors of production: skilled labour (l
s), unskilled labour (l
u), 
materials or cost of goods sold (m) and capital stock (k).  For estimation purposes we employ 
a first-order Taylor approximation and write the production function as: 




it s it TFP m k l l y + + + + + = β β β β β0         ( A 1 )  
TFP is assumed to follow the following AR(1) process: 
it i t it it v f D TFP TFP + + + = − δ ρ 1         ( A 2 )  
where D is a common year-specific shock, f is a time-invariant firm specific effect and v a 
random error term.  Note that we do not simply model productivity as a fixed effect, as that 
would imply that TFP differences are fixed, and there is no role for technology diffusion 
(convergence). 
Recently the fundamental assumption of pooling individual times series data has been 
questioned.  Pesaran and Smith (1995) demonstrate that standard GMM estimators of 
dynamic panel models lead to invalid inference if the response parameters are characterised 
by heterogeneity.  They argue that one is better off averaging parameters from individual time 
series regressions.  This is not feasible here since the individual firm’s time series data is not 
of adequate length.  However, we take some comfort from a recent comparative study by 
Baltagi and Griffin (1997) which concludes that efficiency gains from pooling are likely to 
more than offset the biases due to individual heterogeneity.  Baltagi and Griffin (1997) 
especially point out the desirable properties of  the GLS-AR(1) estimator, and we use this 
estimator to obtain estimates of the factor elasticities, and derive  TFP as a residual term.  We 




Table 1: Mean outsourcing intensity by sector 
(standard deviation in parentheses) 
 
Sector All  foreign  domestic 
Chemicals 0.138  0.161  0.128 
 (0.279)  (0.256)  (0.343) 
Engineering 0.140  0.161  1.136 
 (0.360)  (0.288)  (0.226) 
Electronics 0.091  0.097  0.090 

























































































Table 2: Determinants of outsourcing – OLS regression in levels 
Dependent variable: log of industrial services received 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  chem I  chem II  engin I  enging II  electr I  electr II 
sizet-1  1.542 1.587 1.521 1.578 1.754 1.767 
  (0.060)** (0.067)** (0.047)** (0.048)** (0.046)** (0.050)** 
skilled wage t-1  0.837 0.814 0.399 0.378 0.392 0.384 
  (0.216)** (0.226)** (0.163)*  (0.162)*  (0.137)** (0.138)** 
unskilled wage t-1  0.028 0.006 0.117 0.148 0.068 0.065 
  (0.152) (0.174) (0.049)*  (0.057)**  (0.058) (0.063) 
foreign  dummy  0.665 0.433 0.612 0.574 0.309 0.144 
  (0.139)** (0.233)+  (0.120)** (0.140)** (0.144)*  (0.185) 
foreign * size t-1   -0.183   -0.404   -0.097 
   (0.119)   (0.147)**   (0.120) 
foreign* skilled 
wage t-1 
 0.042   0.330   0.069 
   (0.268)   (0.102)**   (0.129) 
foreign * unskilled 
wage t-1 
 0.103   -0.083   0.015 
   (0.270)   (0.055)   (0.114) 
union    1.218  1.121    
    (1.368)  (1.363)    
Constant  -5.731 -5.667 -3.999 -4.175 -10.001  -10.041 
  (2.510)* (2.484)* (1.969)* (1.948)* (2.901)**  (2.911)** 
Observations  6917  6917  23555 23555 12552 12552 
F-test   1.31   3.49*   0.52 
R-squared  0.32 0.32 0.20 0.21 0.26 0.26 
 
Notes: 
Heteroskedasticity-autocorrelation consistent standard errors in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Regressions include 4-digit sector, time, region and sectoral time dummies 
Union variable in (1), (2), (5) and (6) is dropped due to multicollinearity with the sectoral time dummies 






Table 3: Determinants of outsourcing – first differences with lagged level of outsourcing 
Dependent variable: log of industrial services received 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  chem I  chem II  engin I  enging II  electr I  electr II 
outs t-1  -0.346 -0.345 -0.353 -0.353 -0.327 -0.327 
  (0.021)** (0.021)** (0.010)** (0.010)** (0.012)** (0.012)** 
∆ sizet-1  0.211 0.264 -0.131  -0.132  0.156 0.162 
  (0.309) (0.325) (0.125) (0.126) (0.152) (0.157) 
∆ skilled wage t-1  0.414 0.344 0.002 -0.005  -0.081  -0.071 
  (0.270) (0.281) (0.089) (0.089) (0.143) (0.144) 
∆ unskilled wage t-1  -0.006  0.052 0.151 0.184 -0.050  -0.069 
  (0.149) (0.184) (0.054)**  (0.064)**  (0.051) (0.055) 
foreign  dummy  0.501 0.490 0.581 0.584 0.385 0.390 
  (0.083)** (0.085)** (0.063)** (0.065)** (0.081)** (0.084)** 
foreign * ∆ size t-1   -0.130   0.015   -0.045 
   (0.213)   (0.134)   (0.160) 
foreign* ∆ skilled 
wage t-1 
 0.266   0.096   -0.113 
   (0.247)   (0.103)   (0.118) 
foreign * ∆ 
unskilled wage t-1 
 -0.185   -0.118   0.145 
   (0.239)   (0.074)   (0.072)* 
union    -0.796  -0.821    
    (1.524)  (1.527)    
Constant  4.804 3.482 4.120 4.131 5.776 5.788 
  (1.090)** (1.257)** (0.777)** (0.778)** (1.981)** (1.979)** 
Observations  5707  5707  18428 18428 10095 10095 
F-test   0.41   0.98   1.41 
R-squared  0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.18 
 
Notes: 
Heteroskedasticity-autocorrelation consistent standard errors in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Regressions include 4-digit sector, time, region and sectoral time dummies 
Union variable in (1), (2), (5) and (6) is dropped due to multicollinearity with the sectoral time dummies 






Table 4: Labour productivity and outsourcing: 
Instrumental variables estimates (labpro_3.do ) 
 
  Chemicals sector  Electronics sector  Engineering sector 






Capital intensity  0.020 0.004 -0.049  0.026 0.028 -0.000 
  (2.84)***  (0.47) (1.07) (1.52) (2.83)***  (0.01) 
Material inputs 
intensity  
0.773 0.732 0.991 0.551 0.587 0.531 
  (20.40)*** (13.78)*** (5.63)***  (5.49)***  (15.75)*** (17.16)*** 
Outsourcing 
Intensity  
0.174 0.135 -0.468  -0.410  0.491 0.002 




0.019 0.009 0.009 0.014 0.076 0.047 
  (1.65)*  (0.84) (0.24) (0.63) (2.25)**  (3.34)*** 
Exogeneity test  
(p-value)  
0 1 .995  1 .239  0 














 Sargan  
(p-value} 
.377 .602 .351 .237 
 
543 .202 
Observations  6115  6115  10882 10882 18793 13245 
Number  of  plants  1133 1133 2184 2184 4376 4376 
 
Notes: 
Regressions include time and region dummies. 
Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
The tests of exogeneity is a Hausman test which examines the null hypothesis that there is no statistically significant 




Table 5: TFP and outsourcing: 
Instrumental variables estimates (tfp_3.do ) 
 
  Chemicals sector  Electronics sector  Engineering sector 








0.087  0.257 -0.645  0.054 0.346  0.158 




0.019  0.026  -0.004 -0.011 0.078  0.449 
  (2.22)** (1.22)  (0.10)  (1.63) (3.12)***  (2.60)*** 
Exogeneity test  
(p-value)  
.01  .991  1 1 .499  .4627 














 Sargan  
(p-value} 
.155  .496 .652 .133 .127  .060 
Observations 6115 5068  10882  8723  18793 13245 
Number of plants  1133  896  2184  1638  4376  2941 
 
Notes: 
Regressions include time and region dummies. 
Heteroskedasticity  consistent standard errors in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
The tests of exogeneity is a  Hausman test which examines the null hypothesis that there is no statistically significant 




Table 6: Contribution of outsourcing to productivity growth: 
Median values across establishments (counter.do) 
 
  Chemicals sector  Engineering sector 
  Actual yearly 













Labour productivity       
Domestic  2.17% 4.7%    1.6%  14.7% 
Foreign   3.06% 2.4%  2.66% 6.8% 
       
TFP       
Domestic  -.6% 1.1%  -.1% 24.4% 
Foreign   0% 0%  -.1%  0% 
 
Note:  
The implied changes in productivity due to outsourcing is obtained by multiplying the point estimates of the 
elasticity of productivity with respect to outsourcing by the actual change in outsourcing intensity in the data. 
The estimates are obtained from the models in levels. 
 
 
 